English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: The optimality of being efficient : designing auctions Ausubel, Lawerence M.; Cramton, Peter

User activity

Share to:
 
Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/188098
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • The optimality of being efficient : designing auctions
Author
  • Ausubel, Lawerence M.
  • Cramton, Peter
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • A cornerstone of the auction literature is the theory of"optimal auctions."'This theory uses mechanism design techniques to characterize, in general settings, the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenues. One feature of the solution is that typically there is a conflict between the goals of revenue maximization and efficiency. The revenue-optimizing seller often either places goods in hands other than those who value them the most or withholds goods entirely from the market. However, the conclusion that the seller gains by assigning goods inefficiently depends critically on two strong assumptions: (1) the seller can prevent resale among bidders from occurring after the auction; and (2) the seller can commit to not sell the withheld goods after the auction. In this paper, the authors examine how the optimal auction problem changes when one or both of these assumptions are relaxed. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the authors establish the seller's general incentive to misassign goods and they identify settings where the optimal auction is efficient. In section 3, they solve two variations on the optimal auction, which recognize the possibility of resale. Section 4 proves that perfect resale destroys the seller's incentive to misassign goods. Section 5 establishes that with perfect resale, any misassignment of goods results in strictly lower seller revenues than the best efficient assignment. In section 6, the paper shows that the Vickrey auction is not distorted by the possibility of resale.
  • International Terrorism&​Counterterrorism,Environmental Economics&​Policies,Economic Theory&​Research,Banks&​Banking Reform,Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&​Research,Banks&​Banking Reform,Access to Markets,International Terrorism&​Counterterrorism,Environmental Economics&​Policies
  • RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1985
Language
  • English
Contributed by
OAIster

Get this edition

  • Set up My libraries

    How do I set up "My libraries"?

    In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to, you must first login or sign up. Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.

  • All (1)
  • Unknown (1)
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.

User activity


e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

Separate different tags with a comma. To include a comma in your tag, surround the tag with double quotes.

Be the first to add a tag for this edition

Be the first to add this to a list

Comments and reviews

What are comments? Add a comment

No user comments or reviews for this version

Add a comment