Bank privatization in Argentina : a model of political constraints and differential outcomes / George R.G. Clarke and Robert Cull Clarke, George R. G

User activity

Share to:
View the summary of this work
Clarke, George R. G
Banks and banking - Argentina.; Privatization - Argentina.; Banks and banking - Argentina - Econometric models.
In describing outcomes, the literature on privatization has paid little attention to politicians' incentives, perhaps because it lacked the kinds of evidence needed to do so. Evidence from the privatization of provincial Argentine banks in the 1990s indicates that transaction contract features vary systematically with proxies for politicians' incentives. Will variation in transaction features have implications for post-privatization performance?
Work ID

User activity

e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

Separate different tags with a comma. To include a comma in your tag, surround the tag with double quotes.

Be the first to add a tag for this work

Be the first to add this to a list

Comments and reviews

What are comments? Add a comment

No user comments or reviews for this work

Add a comment

Show comments and reviews from Amazon users