English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Research. Simona Fabrizi; Steffen Lippert

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/183351
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Research.
Author
  • Simona Fabrizi
  • Steffen Lippert
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • We address the question of how the internal organization of partnerships can be affected by moral hazard behavior of their division(s)/​agent(s). We explore cases where two entregreneurs, each employing one agent subject ot moral hazard, decide how to conduct a research project together. The project's success probability is affected by agent(s)' effort(s). A joint entity can take two configurations: either both, or only one agent is kept. If two agents are kept, all degrees of substitutability between agents' efforts are considered. We show that the privately optimal internal organization of the joint entity is also socially optimal, except when agents' efforts just start to duplicate each other. In this range, due to moral hazard, too few parterships keeping both agents occur as compared to what would be socially optimal. A restriction on the number of agents to be kept in a partnership would induce too few of them leading to socially worse outcomes.
  • internal organization of partnerships, moral hazard, efforts' interactions, cost functions
  • RePEc:trf:wpaper:18
  • This paper analyzes the impact of agency problems on two entrepreneurs’ choice whether to carry out a stand-alone or a joint project. A joint project can be conducted by a single or both entrepreneurs’ research units, which are substitutes to a varying degree. Joint projects are chosen when they are of high value and/​or for low degrees of duplication and complementarities between the units. Agency problems reduce the occurrence of joint projects as they have to be of higher value and/​or exploit higher synergies. Joint projects making use of potential synergies are chosen too seldomly from a welfare standpoint.
  • Agency problems, joint projects, internal organization, synergies.
  • RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:200310
Language
  • English
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