English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: Bargaining with Endogenous Deadlines Ana MAULEON; Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH

User activity

Share to:
 
Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/178567
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Bargaining with Endogenous Deadlines
Author
  • Ana MAULEON
  • Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique outcome is always inefficient
  • bargaining;alternating-offers;deadlines;complete infomation
  • RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001021
Language
  • English
Contributed by
OAIster

Get this edition

Other links

  • Set up My libraries

    How do I set up "My libraries"?

    In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to, you must first login or sign up. Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.

  • All (1)
  • Unknown (1)
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.

User activity


e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

Separate different tags with a comma. To include a comma in your tag, surround the tag with double quotes.

Be the first to add a tag for this edition

Be the first to add this to a list

Comments and reviews

What are comments? Add a comment

No user comments or reviews for this version

Add a comment