A Coordination Game Model of Charitable Giving and Seed Money Effect
We point out that if potential donors for a charity project possess the warm-glow properties in their preferences, their behavior can be represented by a coordination game. Accordingly, we construct a simultaneous incomplete information game model of charitable giving on the basis of a simple global coordination game. We demonstrate that by considering the threshold shift effect of seed money exclusively, the proportion of donors and the total amount of donation strictly and continuously increase according to the amount of seed money. This result is quite compatible with the field experimental study of List and Lucking-Reiley [List, J. A., Lucking-Reiley, D., 2002. The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign. Journal of Political Economy 110 (1), 215-233].
In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to,
you must first login
or sign up.
Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by
clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.