Family altruism and incentives / Roberta Gatti Gatti, Roberta

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Author
Gatti, Roberta
Subjects
Altruism - Econometric models.; Inheritance and succession - Econometric models.
Summary
In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the family predicts. Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup whenever the non-negativity constraint on bequests is not binding.
Bookmark
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/153877
Work ID
153877

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e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

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