Uncertainty and Climate Treaties: Does Ignorance Pay? Dellink, Rob; Finus, Michael

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Dellink, Rob ; Finus, Michael
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Resource and Energy Economics
Global temperature changes -- Analysis; Climate -- Analysis; Environmental economics -- Analysis
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.05.007 Byline: Rob Dellink (a), Michael Finus (b) Keywords: International climate agreements; Uncertainty; Learning; Information effect; Strategic effect; Stability effect Abstract: a* Uncertainty and learning play an important role in climate change. a* Learning can have a negative impact on the success of international treaty formation. a* Numerical simulations with climate model shows that such negative outcomes are rare. a* A clever transfer scheme can make a significant difference to mitigate free-riding. a* Clever transfers can overcome the negative impacts of learning should they occur. Author Affiliation: (a) Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands (b) Department of Economics, University of Bath, UK Article History: Received 15 September 2010; Revised 21 May 2012; Accepted 24 May 2012
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