English, Article edition: Implementing high-powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply Leon Yang Chu; David E.M. Sappington

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  • article
Language
  • English

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Title
  • Implementing high-powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply
Author
  • Leon Yang Chu
  • David E.M. Sappington
Physical Description
  • article
Notes
  • We characterize the optimal contract between a principal and a risk-neutral, wealth-constrained agent when an adverse selection problem follows a moral hazard problem. The optimal contract in this setting often is more steeply sloped for the largest output levels than is the optimal contract in either the standard moral hazard setting or the standard adverse selection setting. The large incremental rewards for exceptional performance motivate the agent to deliver substantial effort both before and after he acquires privileged information about the production environment. Copyright (c) 2009, RAND.
  • RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:2:p:296-316
Language
  • English
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