English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining Kareen Rozen

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/147648
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining
Author
  • Kareen Rozen
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • We consider a multilateral Nash demand game where short-sighted players come to the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource. We prove that group learning leads with probability one to complete cooperation and a strictly self-enforcing allocation (i.e., in the interior of the core). Highlighting group dynamics, we demonstrate that behaviors which appear destructive can themselves lead to beneficial and strictly self-enforcing cooperation.
  • Nash bargaining, Learning, Core, Group conflict
  • RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1641
  • RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000002086
Language
  • English
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