English, Article edition: BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE VICENT CALABUIG; ANTONI CUNYAT; GONZALO OLCINA

User activity

Share to:
 
Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/144765
Physical Description
  • article
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE
Author
  • VICENT CALABUIG
  • ANTONI CUNYAT
  • GONZALO OLCINA
Physical Description
  • article
Notes
  • We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are delayed with positive probability.
  • Bargaining, endogenous commitment, delays, uncertain deadline, JEL Classification: C78
  • RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:525-532
Language
  • English
Contributed by
OAIster

Get this edition

  • Set up My libraries

    How do I set up "My libraries"?

    In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to, you must first login or sign up. Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.

  • All (1)
  • Unknown (1)
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.

User activity


e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

Separate different tags with a comma. To include a comma in your tag, surround the tag with double quotes.

Be the first to add a tag for this edition

Be the first to add this to a list

Comments and reviews

What are comments? Add a comment

No user comments or reviews for this version

Add a comment