English, Article edition: EVOLUTION AND THE COMPLEXITY OF FINITE AUTOMATA MOEZ KILANI

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/144757
Physical Description
  • article
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • EVOLUTION AND THE COMPLEXITY OF FINITE AUTOMATA
Author
  • MOEZ KILANI
Physical Description
  • article
Notes
  • Prisoner's dilemma played by finite automata is reviewed again using a slightly modified measure of complexity. At a first step, an equilibrium with a large number of possible outcomes is shown to hold. At a second stage, we consider a game of repeated interaction, and show that on (limit) equilibrium only cooperative actions are played. We conclude that cooperation is the result of a (complex) long interaction.
  • Finite automata, complexity of the strategy, cooperation, evolution
  • RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:731-743
Language
  • English
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