English, Article edition: ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY FUHITO KOJIMA; SATORU TAKAHASHI

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Physical Description
  • article
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY
Author
  • FUHITO KOJIMA
  • SATORU TAKAHASHI
Physical Description
  • article
Notes
  • We introduce the class of anti-coordination games. A symmetric two-player game is said to have the anti-coordination property if, for any mixed strategy, any worst response to the mixed strategy is in the support of the mixed strategy. Every anti-coordination game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, which lies in the interior of the set of mixed strategies. We investigate the dynamic stability of the equilibrium in a one-population setting. Specifically we focus on the best response dynamic (BRD), where agents in a large population take myopic best responses, and the perfect foresight dynamic (PFD), where agents maximize total discounted payoffs from the present to the future. For any anti-coordination game we show (i) that, for any initial distribution, BRD has a unique solution, which reaches the equilibrium in a finite time, (ii) that the same path is one of the solutions to PFD, and (iii) that no path escapes from the equilibrium in PFD once the path reaches the equilibrium. Moreover we show (iv) that, in some subclasses of anti-coordination games, for any initial state, any solution to PFD converges to the equilibrium. All the results for PFD hold for any discount rate.
  • Anti-coordination games, best response dynamic, perfect foresight dynamic
  • RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:667-688
Language
  • English
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