Why Doesn't Society Minimize Central Bank Secrecy?
Karen K. Lewis
Societies have incentives to design institutions that allow central bank
secrecy. This paper illustrates these incentives in two ways. First, if
society tries to constrain secrecy in one way, central bankers will try to
regain lost effectiveness by building up secrecy in other ways.
Therefore, we may wind up accepting types of secrecy that appear
preventable because reducing them would lead to higher costs. Second, if
the social trade-offs between policy objectives change over time, the
public may directly prefer greater central bank secrecy so that it will be
surprised with expansionary policies when it most desires them.
In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to,
you must first login
or sign up.
Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by
clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.