English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: The Folk Theorems in the Framework of Evolution and Cooperation. A. Vasin

User activity

Share to:
 
Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/138855
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • The Folk Theorems in the Framework of Evolution and Cooperation.
Author
  • A. Vasin
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • Proceeding from the latest version of the Folk Theorems, the present paper shows that "natural" evolution of behavior in repeated games in human populations is a very unstable process which may be easily manipulated by outside forces. Any feasible and individually rational payoff of the game may be converted in the globally stable outcome by arbitrary small perturbation of the payoff functions in the repeated game. We show that this result also holds for a trembling-hand perturbation of the game, and prove a new version of the Folk theorem for this case. This conclusion is in contrast to Axelrod (1984), Sigmund and Nowak (1992) and some other researches of evolution of behavior in the repeated Prisoner's dilemma. We discuss the reasons of the difference in the results.
  • RePEc:wop:iasawp:ir98074
Language
  • English
Contributed by
OAIster

Get this edition

  • Set up My libraries

    How do I set up "My libraries"?

    In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to, you must first login or sign up. Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.

  • All (1)
  • Unknown (1)
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.

User activity


e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

Separate different tags with a comma. To include a comma in your tag, surround the tag with double quotes.

Be the first to add a tag for this edition

Be the first to add this to a list

Comments and reviews

What are comments? Add a comment

No user comments or reviews for this version

Add a comment