Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion Page Junior, Frank H.; Monteiro, Paulo Klinger; Svaiter, Benar Fux

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Page Junior, Frank H. ; Monteiro, Paulo Klinger ; Svaiter, Benar Fux
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The Journal of Mathematical Economics
Auctions -- Analysis; Economics; Analysis
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.11.001 Byline: Paulo Klinger Monteiro, Frank H. Page, Benar fux Svaiter Abstract: Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of a positive measure of bidder types occur. The results complements Armstrong's (1996) exclusion of types result. Article History: Received 23 August 2011; Revised 17 September 2012; Accepted 11 November 2012 Article Note: (footnote) [star] Monteiro and Svaiter acknowledge the financial support of CNPq. Page acknowledges the financial support and hospitality of CERMSEM, University of Paris I.
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