The set of equilibria of first-price auctions Monteiro, Paulo Klinger

User activity

Share to:
View the summary of this work
Author
Monteiro, Paulo Klinger
Appears In
The Journal of Mathematical Economics
Subjects
Auctions; Equilibrium (Economics) -- Research; Mathematics
Audience
Academic
Summary
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.10.002 Byline: Paulo Klinger Monteiro Keywords: First-price auction; Equilibria Abstract: I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of symmetric first-price auctions. A formula to recover the distribution of valuations for any equilibrium bidding strategy is given. Author Affiliation: FGV-EPGE, Praia de Botafogo 190, Sala 1103, 22250-900, RJ, Brazil Article History: Received 30 September 2004; Revised 6 September 2005; Accepted 5 October 2005 Article Note: (footnote) [star] I acknowledge the comments of Luis Braido, Carlos Costa, Marcelo Fernandes, Luiz Lima and Frank Page.
Bookmark
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/120163
Work ID
120163

4 editions of this work

Find a specific edition
Thumbnail [View as table] [View as grid] Title, Author, Edition Date Language Format Libraries

User activity


e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

Separate different tags with a comma. To include a comma in your tag, surround the tag with double quotes.

Be the first to add a tag for this work

Be the first to add this to a list

Comments and reviews

What are comments? Add a comment

No user comments or reviews for this work

Add a comment


Show comments and reviews from Amazon users