The unilateral incentives for technology transfers: Predation (and deterrence) by proxy.(Report) Creane, Anthony; Konishi, Hideo

User activity

Share to:
View the summary of this work
Creane, Anthony ; Konishi, Hideo
Appears In
International Journal of Industrial Organization
Predation (Biology); Business, international; Business
To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: Byline: Anthony Creane (a), Hideo Konishi (b) Keywords: Entry deterrence; Predation; Technology transfers Abstract: Joint production between rival firms often entails knowledge transfers without direct compensation, leaving the question as to why more efficient firms would give their rivals such an advantage. We find that such transfers are credible mechanisms to make the market more competitive so as to deter entry or force exit. We determine that with free entry such transfers are profitable and further it may be optimal to predate or deter every firm possible so that a market with many firms can become a duopoly. While consumers are harmed by such action, production efficiency normally increases sufficiently so that welfare increases. Author Affiliation: (a) Michigan State University, United States (b) Boston College, United States Article History: Received 12 October 2007; Revised 2 September 2008; Accepted 23 October 2008 Article Note: (footnote) [star] We are grateful to Jay Pil Choi for his comments on a preliminary version of this paper, to the two anonymous referees and the editor for their thoughtful and detailed comments on our paper, and to Mihkel Tombak for his discussion of our paper, as well as to the conference participants at the IIOC, 2008.
Work ID

2 editions of this work

Find a specific edition
Thumbnail [View as table] [View as grid] Title, Author, Edition Date Language Format Libraries

User activity

e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

Separate different tags with a comma. To include a comma in your tag, surround the tag with double quotes.

Be the first to add a tag for this work

Be the first to add this to a list

Comments and reviews

What are comments? Add a comment

No user comments or reviews for this work

Add a comment

Show comments and reviews from Amazon users