English, Article edition: Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information Cheng Wang

User activity

Share to:
 
Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/112478
Physical Description
  • article
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information
Author
  • Cheng Wang
Physical Description
  • article
Notes
  • This paper studies the issue of renegotiation in a model of dynamic moral hazard. I introduce the notion of a renegotiation-proof dynamic contract. I show that the constraint of renegotiation-proofness can have the effect of setting a higher lower bound to the set of attainable expected utilities of the agent. This result extends the notion of "credit rationing" from the static models of optimal contracting to a dynamic setting, and is useful for thinking about competition for long-term contracts. This result also has implications for the long-run behavior of the expected utility of the agent under dynamic contracting. (Copyright: Elsevier)
  • dynamic contracting, renegociations
  • RePEc:red:issued:v:3:y:2000:i:3:p:396-422
Language
  • English
Contributed by
OAIster

Get this edition

Other links

  • Set up My libraries

    How do I set up "My libraries"?

    In order to set up a list of libraries that you have access to, you must first login or sign up. Then set up a personal list of libraries from your profile page by clicking on your user name at the top right of any screen.

  • All (1)
  • Unknown (1)
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.
None of your libraries hold this item.

User activity


e.g. test cricket, Perth (WA), "Parkes, Henry"

Separate different tags with a comma. To include a comma in your tag, surround the tag with double quotes.

Be the first to add a tag for this edition

Be the first to add this to a list

Comments and reviews

What are comments? Add a comment

No user comments or reviews for this version

Add a comment