English, Article edition: Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent Foster, Dean P.; Young, H. Peyton

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/111520
Physical Description
  • article
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent
Author
  • Foster, Dean P.
  • Young, H. Peyton
Physical Description
  • article
Notes
  • A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any finite two-person game.
  • Learning, Nash equilibrium, regret, bounded rationality
  • RePEc:the:publsh:199
Language
  • English
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