English, Article, Journal or magazine article edition: Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies of Homogeneous Indivisible Goods Kentaro Hatsumi; Shigehiro Serizawa

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Bookmark: http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/106827
Physical Description
  • preprint
Language
  • English

Edition details

Title
  • Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies of Homogeneous Indivisible Goods
Author
  • Kentaro Hatsumi
  • Shigehiro Serizawa
Physical Description
  • preprint
Notes
  • We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that a rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is the uniform probabilistic rule. By constructing an example, we show that if same-sideness is replaced by respect for unanimity, this statement does not hold even with the additional requirements of no-envy, anonymity, at most binary, peaks-onlyness and continuity.
  • RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0686
Language
  • English
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